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Chances are, if you have ever purchased an item, you are among 
the many unnamed members of a litigation class action lawsuit. 
According to a report published in March 2017 by the Perkins Coie 
Food Litigation Group, the food and beverage industry has become a 
top target for class actions and individual lawsuits, with nearly 10 
class action filings in Illinois, and over 140 filings nationwide, in 2016 
alone.
1 The uptick in consumer fraud lawsuits involving food and 
drink means more money for lawyers, but has left consumers with 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Member of Chicago-Kent Moot Court Honor Society (2016‒2017); 
Legal Writing I & II Teaching Assistant; DePaul University, B.A., Communications, 
2010.  
1 
David T. Biderman, Julie L. Hussey, Charles C. Sipos, Food Litigation 2016 
Year in Review: A Look Back at Key Issues Facing Our Industry, at 
https://dpntax5jbd3l.cloudfront.net/images/content/1/7/v2/171826/2017-Food 
-Litigation-YIR-FINAL-2.pdf (Mar. 28, 2017) (finding the number of food class 
action lawsuits filed each year has significantly increased since 2008, with California 
remaining the favored jurisdiction with over 60 cases filed; however, Illinois remains 
popular with just under 10 actions filed in 2016).  
1
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 In many states, lawyers have found that vague laws on 
unfair and deceptive practices are conducive to extracting large 
settlements from food companies. Whether plaintiffs are seeking 
monetary relief for being purposefully misled, or simply hoping to call 
out businesses for their puffery; attorneys are undoubtedly the real 
victors.  
This Article evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re 
Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation 
to explore the effects of excessive attorney fee awards on consumer 
fraud class actions, and to determine how, if at all, food litigation 
could be more equitable to consumers. Part I will explain the evolution 
of class actions, which eventually culminated in the passage of more 
defined fairness standards. Part II will discuss current trends in food 
and drink class action litigation. Part III will focus on In re Subway 
Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation, 
highlighting how courts can underestimate the value of injunctive 
relief in light of exorbitant attorney’s fees. Part IV will suggest 
limitations and guidelines the legal community should consider in the 
wake of interminable food marketing class action lawsuits. 
 
RISE OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 
 
The class action lawsuit as it exists today is mainly a product of 
statutes and rules. The origin can be traced to England’s courts of 
chancery.
3
 In the 12
th
 century, England allowed litigation on behalf of 
                                                 
2 
Settlement Agreement, Guoliang Ma, et al. v. Harmless Harvest, Inc., No. 
2:16-cv-07102-JMA-SIL. Available at: https://www.foodlitigationnews.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2017/05/Ma-et-al.-v.-Harmless-Harvest-Inc.-Settlement-
Agreement.pdf. (proposing that while the makers of Harmless Coconut Water would 
engage in product label reviews, attorney’s fees would be awarded in the amount of 
$575,000); see also Birbrower v. Quorn Foods, Inc., No.2:16-cv-01326-DMG (C.D. 
Cal. dismissed Sept. 11, 2017) (proposing a settlement whereby Quorn would no 
longer market their products as being made from mushrooms or truffles but class 
counsel would receive over half the settlement fund, $1.35 million).  
3 
Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of Class Action, 23 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 515, 517 (1974) (“All trace their origins, however to the unwritten practice of 
English Chancery at a time before the adoption of our own judicial system.”).  
2
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villages and parishes with an 1125 writ of Henry III to the archbishop 
of Canterbury, which stated, “according to our law and custom of the 
realm . . . villages and communities . . . ought to be able to prosecute 
their pleas and complaints in our courts and in those of others through 
three or four of their number.”
4 
  
Early examples of group or class litigation include a 12
th
 century 
case, Master Martin Rector of Barkway v. Parishioners of 
Nuthampstead.
5 
Nuthahampstead chapel was once an independent 
church, but it eventually became a member of the church of Barkway.
6
 
After merging with the Barkway church, a dispute arose about the 
rector receiving a payment of tithes in return for his services.
7 
This 
dispute could be viewed as a religious class action, related to how 





 century case identified as Discart v. Otes is an 
example of a judicially created class action.
9
 In this case, which 
concerned currency used in the Channel Islands, the justices decided 
that instead of ruling, they would pass the matter on to the King’s 
Council, so that Discart and all others with similar claims could 
receive a single, binding judgment.
10
 This created a new type of suit, 
the “Bills of Peace,” whereby one person sued in the hopes of 
resolving the matter in favor of themselves and other similarly situated 
persons.
11
 Alas, the class action was born.  
                                                 
4 
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes 
of Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 690 (1997).  
5 
Susan T. Spence, Looking Back . . . In a Collective Way: A Short History of 







A tithe is one-tenth part of something, generally produce or personal income, 
set apart and paid as a contribution to a religious organization. 
9 
Marcin, supra note 3, at 521-23. 
10 
Id. at 521. 
11 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1297, 1326 (1932) (noting that one concern about consolidating many suits into 
3
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A. Class Actions in the United States 
 
In the mid 19
th
 century, the Supreme Court promulgated Federal 
Equity Rule 48, which expressly provided for “group representative 
litigation.”
12 
While this new codification allowed cases involving 
numerous parties to proceed on a representative basis, the rule was 
clear that the judgment of the court had no binding effect on absent 
class members.
13
 Eleven years later, the Supreme Court ignored Rule 
48’s closing remarks and held that a judgment in a representative suit 
did indeed bind absent class members.
14 
 
Early in the 20
th
 century, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
15
 Included in these rules was Rule 23, which still 
regulates class action lawsuits today.
16
 It was not until 1966, however, 
that the Supreme Court advisory committee amended Rule 23 to 
explicitly provide that class action judgments would bind all members 
of the class who did not opt out of the suit.
17 
 
Under Rule 23, plaintiffs seeking to proceed under a class action 
must plead and prove: (1) an adequate class definition, (2) 
ascertainability, (3) numerocity, (4) commonality, (5) typicality, and 
(6) adequacy.
18
 Additionally, plaintiffs must demonstrate that separate 
                                                                                                                   
one hearing was the “crowding and confusion in the courtroom if each party had 
their own lawyer”).  
12 
Nikita Malhotra Pastor, Equity and Settlement Class Actions: Can There Be 
Justice for All in Ortiz v. Fibreboard, AM. U. L. REV. 49, NO. 3, 773, 785 (February 
2000). 
13 
Id. at 785 n.63. 
14 
See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853) (holding “[f]or 
convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a 
portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all 
of them the same as if all were before the court”). 
15 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective September 16, 1938, govern 
civil proceedings in United States district courts.  
16 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  
17
 For comparison of the old and new versions of Rule 23, see 39 F.R.D. 69, 
94-98 (1966).  
18 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
4
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adjudications will create a risk of decisions that are inconsistent with 
or dispositive of other class members’ claims, declaratory or injunctive 
relief is appropriate based on the defendant’s acts with respect to the 
class generally, or that common questions predominate and a class 
action is superior to individual actions.
19
 
As such, class actions were intended to do more than simply 
provide a manageable way to deal with numerous plaintiffs; the 
primary purpose was to increase the efficiency and economy of 
litigation.
20 
 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that class actions 
provide an opportunity for people with individually insignificant 
claims to band together and seek relief.
21
 As civil rights leaders, 
environmentalists, and consumer advocates began utilizing this useful 
procedural litigation device, modern class action case law and Rule 23 
became increasingly important. 
 
B. Protecting Consumers Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 
 
After the 1980s and 1990s, the wave of mass litigation in 
asbestos, lead, and dangerous drugs began to wind down. Tort-reform 
laws capped the damages plaintiff could obtain, and new heightened 
pleading standards made it harder to bring deficient lawsuits.
22
 As 
such, plaintiff’s lawyers set their sights on a new profit-making target: 
consumer-fraud class action litigation. Consumer-fraud cases were 
relatively easy to file and class action lawyers had a plethora of 
plaintiffs at their disposal because millions of people purchase and 
consume products every day. However, class members have yet to 
                                                 
19 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 
20 
See General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 148 (1982).  
21
 See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (stating that 
class actions serve not only to protect the defendant from inconsistent obligations, 
but protect the interests of absentees while providing a convenient and efficient 
means of settling similar lawsuits).  
22 
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and 
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1030(2002). 
5
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recover grand sums through these lawsuits, even though the attorneys 
continue to receive big payouts.  
Looking to cash in quick, class action lawyers began filing 
consumer-fraud suits in waves.
23
 In order to combat this uptick in 
filings, business groups and tort reform supporters lobbied for more 
legislation to restrict class action lawsuits.
24 
These actions led to the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), which placed large 
class-action lawsuits in federal court, removing them from historically 
more receptive state courts.
25
 Interestingly, while business groups 
bogged down by excessive consumer-fraud cases urged this reform, 
CAFA itself claimed to protect consumer class members from 
excessive attorney’s fees.
26
 In part, CAFA intended to curtail attorneys’ 
abilities to tie their fee awards to the nominal value of coupons made 
available to a settlement class.
27 
 Where coupons provided the only 
basis for relief, the portion of attorney’s fees awarded to class counsel 
would be based on the value that the class members receiving the 
coupons redeemed, rather than the face value of all coupons issued.
28
 
Thus, attorney’s fees are not based on the recovery by the class, rather, 
they are “based upon the amount of time class counsel reasonably 
expended working on the action.”
29
 
                                                 
23 
See Jeckle v. Crotty LLP, 85 P. 3d 931 (Wash. App. Div. 3 2004) (alleging 
that a physician engaged in consumer fraud rather than malpractice where he 
advertised his own weight-loss drugs to his patients).  
24
 William Branigin, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, WASHINGTON 
POST, (Oct. 1, 2017),  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32674-




 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 stat. 4 (Feb. 18, 2005) 
§2. (finding that “Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, 
and are sometimes harmed, such as where counsel are awarded large fees, while 
leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value.”) 
27 
 S. REP. NO. 109-14,  at 14, 30 (2005)  
28
 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 stat. 4 (Feb. 18, 
2005) §1712. 
29 
28 U.S.C §1712(b)(1). 
6
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Despite this commendable language, neither federal nor state 
courts have changed the way they approach class action lawsuits. 
Many courts continue to approve coupon-based class action 
settlements, without a heightened level of scrutiny.
30
 Moreover, federal 
courts considering settlements post-CAFA have often assumed that the 
standards remained the same.
31
 Despite courts’ hesitancy to view class 
actions differently post-CAFA, courts have used it in evaluating 
requested attorney’s fees.
32
 Even still, while CAFA may have helped 
streamline a method for calculating attorney fee awards, the legislation 
did little to quell the number of consumer-fraud based class action 
cases. Instead, savvy class action lawyers have turned their attention 
toward less regulated areas, such as food and drink advertising.  
 
CURRENT TRENDS IN FOOD AND DRINK CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 
 
Over the last decade, the number of consumer fraud class actions 
filed has skyrocketed. The nationwide filings for 2016 were nearly 
forty-seven percent higher than in 2012.
33
 Undoubtedly, part of the 
increase is caused by consumers’ growing desire for transparency.
34 
For instance, the public has grown leery of food and other products 
                                                 
30
 See Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55-64 (D.D.C. 
2010) (holding that though coupon settlements “pose a particular risk of unfairness 
and unreasonableness,” no additional scrutiny is called for by §1712(e)).  
31 
See In re Tyson Foods, Inc., No. RDB-08-1982, 2010 WL 1924012 (D. Md 
2010) (approving coupons for Tyson products to settle a false advertising class 
action without any mention of CAFA).  
32
 See True v. American Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1077 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (finding that “while the lodestar method of awarding fees is permissible 
under CAFA, the Court . . . is particularly wary of using the lodestar . . . where the 
benefit achieved for the class is small and the lodestar award is large”). 
33 
Supra note 1.  
34 
The 2016 Label Insight Transparency ROI Study, LABEL INSIGHT (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.labelinsight.com/Transparency-ROI-Study (A 2016 consumer 
study found that forty percent of consumers said they would switch to a new brand if 
it offered more product transparency.).  
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that are advertised as “natural.”
35
 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
rushed in to aid disgruntled consumers. Although these consumer class 
action lawsuits were based upon a number of different issues, it was 
not until the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC. v. 
Concepcion, which upheld a company’s right to enforce contracts 
limiting consumers’ ability to band together in class actions lawsuits, 




A. All Natural and Healthy Claims 
 
The first wave of food class action litigation focused on marketing 
that claimed food products were “natural,” “nutritious,” or contained 
“nothing artificial.” Generally, the claims argued that the products 
contained some synthetic ingredient or that the production process 
rendered the product no longer natural. In one notable case, a judicial 
panel in Missouri consolidated dozens of suits, all of which alleged 
that Coca-Cola Simply Orange, Minute Maid Pure Squeezed, and 
Premium orange juices deceived consumers into thinking that the 
juices were 100% pure.
37
 Despite labels touting that the juices were 
“100% Pure Squeezed,” plaintiffs claimed that the addition of added 
flavorings, including orange essence oils, made the labels deceptive to 
consumers.
38 
More specifically, plaintiffs sought to certify classes of 
purchasers of Coca-Cola orange juice products, asserting that Coca-
Cola failed to disclose its use of added flavors in these products.
39
 
Such omissions, plaintiffs claimed, deceived consumers into buying 
                                                 
35
 Id. (finding that more than half of the people surveyed felt they had to use 
their own definition of “healthy” rather than the label itself) 
36 
563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011). 
37 
Emily Field, Judge Unsure On Orange Essence Oil in Coke Juice MDL, 




In re Simply Orange Orange Juice Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 
No. 4:12-md-02361-FJG, 2017 WL 3142095, at *1 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2017). 
8
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these products at premium prices.
40
 And while the court did certify the 
class, the outcome is still pending.
41
  
Disputes arising over broad, undefined nutritional claims provided 
another avenue for litigation. Even where the labels themselves did not 
assert nutritional claims, creative lawyers argued that the images in 
commercials and on product packaging could be interpreted as 
purposefully misleading and deceptive to consumers. In 2012, one 
California mother filed a lawsuit alleging that she was surprised to 
find that Nutella had little to no nutritional value, despite TV 
commercials touting quality ingredients.
42
 The commercial further 
claimed that moms could use Nutella “to get [the] kids to eat healthy 
foods.”
43
 Although the lawsuit was met with much ridicule, the judge 
ultimately sided with the mother, finding that Nutella would need to 
change its marketing campaign and also modify its front labels to 
indicate the fat and sugar content of each jar.
44
  
In 2016, consumers filed a a false advertising lawsuit against 
Krispy Kreme, alleging that the company’s donut fillings lacked 
essential vitamins and nutrients because the filling did not contain real 
fruit.
45
 The case was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice; 
however, plaintiff’s counsel still maintained that Krispy Kreme did not 
provide an ingredient lists for its doughnuts and had they done so, 
consumers would have known that the products did not contain the 
premium ingredients Krispy Kreme led customers to believe were in 






Laurent Belsie, Nutella Settles Lawsuit. You Can Get $20, CHRISTIAN SCI. 





Ryan Jaslow, Nutella Health Claims Net $3.05 Million Settlement in Class-
action Lawsuit, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2012),  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nutella-
health-claims-net-305-million-settlement-in-class-action-lawsuit/ . 
45
 Saidian v. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., No. 2-16-cv-08338-SVW, 2017 
BL 78889, at *1 (C.D. Cal filed Feb. 27, 2017).  
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 In yet another lawsuit, the plaintiff argued that Gerber 
Puffs’ labels were false and misleading because they depicted fruits 




The spike in outlandish claims is partially due to the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) inability to define “natural.”
48
 Current 
FDA policy states that “natural” means “nothing artificial or synthetic 
has been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not 
normally be expected to be in the food.”
49
 After a request from two 
federal judges and petitions from consumers and businesses, the FDA 
began accepting public comments on how to define “natural.”
50
 
Initially, the closing period was May 10, 2016; however, the FDA 
extended the deadline for filing public comments to April 26, 2017.
51
 
Consumers, food producers, and plaintiffs’ attorneys alike await a 
statement by the FDA, which could either fuel new litigation or lead to 
additional dis missals.  
 
B. Slack Fill Claims 
 
Many lawyers are claiming consumers are getting less than they 
bargained for when they get more packaging than product. These types 
                                                 
46 
Richard Craver, False Advertising Lawsuit Against Krispy Kreme 





 Henry v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 15-cv-02201-HZ, 2016 BL 125480, at *1 
(D. Or. Apr. 18, 2016).  
48 
Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, 
Definitions of Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, 




See FDA Request for Comments re the “Use of the Term ‘Natural’ in the 
Labeling of Human Food Products,” 80 Fed. Reg. 69, 905 (proposed Nov. 12, 2015).  
51
 See Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products; 
Request for Information and Comments; Extension of Comment Period, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 96, 404 (proposed Dec. 30, 2016).  
10
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of claims are known as “slack fill” litigation.
52
 FDA regulations 
already restrict the use of useless slack-fill. Extra room in the 
packaging is allowed only when it serves a specific purpose, such as to 
protect the content of the package, a required component of the 
manufacturing process, or is the result of inevitable product settling.
53
 
However, these guidelines have not prevented lawyers from actively 
seeking out packages that may contain unnecessarily unfilled space.  
Courts have already dismissed many slack fill lawsuits.
54 
Judges 
determined that a consumer need only read the number of ounces or 
the quantity count on the packaging to determine the amount of 
product they are actually purchasing.
55
 Despite many courts’ view that 
the reasonable consumer should simply read the packaging, some food 
producers have acknowledged their customers’ dissatisfaction and 




C. Deception Claims 
 
Apart from attacking the nutritional value or the slack fill of a 
product, lawyers are zeroing in on broader deceptions allegedly taking 
place. Coffee companies, like Starbucks, have been accused of tricking 
consumers into thinking they were getting more coffee than they were 
receiving because the cups were not filled to the brim.
57
 Another 
lawsuit against the maker of Tito’s Vodka alleged the brand’s 
                                                 
52 
Bob Fiedler, Slack Fill: Reducing Risks and Improving Bottom Line Profits, 
CHAINANYLTICS (June 2, 2014), http://www.chainalytics.com/slack-fill-reducing-
risks-improving-bottom-line-profits/. 
53
 See 21 C.F.R. §100.100.  
54 
See Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc. No. 16-cv-02460, 2016 WL 5886886, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2016). 
55
 Id. at *3; see also Fermin v. Pfizer, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 209 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016). 
56 
See Complaint, Wurtzburger v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, No. 1:16-cv-08186 
(S.D.N.Y.) (filed Sept. 29, 2016 and removed to federal court from the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York, Duchess County). 
57 
See Strumlauf v. Starbucks Corp., 192 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
11
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advertisements misled consumers into believing that the vodka was 
handmade in an “old fashioned pot.”
58 
 
In 2016, lawyers filed dozens of class action lawsuits against 
Parmesan cheese producers and distributors.
59
 These cases were 
consolidated and transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.
60 
In In 
re 100% Grated Parmesan, the lawsuits did not assert any physical 
injury.
61
 Instead, plaintiffs argued they had been deceived by cheese 
packaging labels that claimed it contained “100% Grated Parmesan 
Cheese.”
62
 In reality, the products contained anywhere from 2% to 8% 
of the food additive cellulose; lawyers claimed the ads intentionally 
misled consumers into believing each product was made of nothing 
but cheese.
63
 As of August 24, 2017, District Court Judge Feinerman 
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding the descriptions on 
the labels were ambiguous, not deceptive. The court explained that a 
reasonable consumer should “still suspect that something other than 
cheese might be in the container.”
64
 Regardless of the specific claim 
being made, food and beverage class action litigation has continued to 
rise, and shows no signs of stopping.  
 
                                                 
58 
See Steven Trader, Vodka Drinkers Seek Cert. in Tito’s ‘Handmade’ False 
Ad Suits, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/745073/vodka-
drinkers-seek-cert-in-tito-s-handmade-false-ad-suits. 
59 
Glenn G. Lammi, Food Court Follies: Judge Grates Parmesan-Cheese 




In re 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese Marketing and Sales Practices 






 Id. at 2; see Lydia Mulvany, The Parmesan Cheese You Sprinkle on Your 
Penne Could Be Wood, Bloomberg, at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/the-parmesan-cheese-you-
sprinkle-on-your-penne-could-be-wood (Feb. 16, 2016). 
64
 In re Parmesan, at *7. 
12
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EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXCESSIVE ATTORNEY’S 
FEES AND LACK OF CONSUMER TRUST IN IN RE SUBWAY FOOTLONG 
SANDWICH MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICE LITIGATION 
 
Many food and beverage class action lawsuits are arguably 
insubstantial; however, many claims genuinely important to 
consumers end up getting dismissed because the benefit to class 
counsel is disproportionately high in comparison to the value provided 
to class members. But, even when courts dismiss cases or refuse to 
certify classes, many companies opt to privately settle, often securing 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for the attorneys.
65
 For instance, in In 
re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practice 
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to 
certify the class, determining that these consolidated class actions 
should have been “dismissed out of hand.”
66
 The Seventh Circuit 
considered three claims in the case: a standing claim, a class 
certification claim, and a settlement approval claim.
67
 For the purposes 
of this Article, only the last two claims are discussed. Understanding 
the relationship between exorbitant class action attorney’s fees and 
consumer dissatisfaction requires a description of both the lower court 
and appellate court’s discussion of the issues. 
 
  
                                                 
65
 Lisa A. Rickard, Litigation Against Food Companies is Increasing, But Who 
Benefits? FOODDIVE (Feb. 28, 2017),  http://www.fooddive.com/news/litigation-
against-food-companies-is-increasing-but-who-benefits/436988/. 
66
 In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 869 
F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 
F.3d 718, ,724 (7th. Cir. 2016)) 
67
 Id.  
13
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A. The District Court 
 
In January 2013, an Australian teenager photographed his Subway 
Footlong sandwich and uploaded it to Facebook.
68
 The image showed 
that his foot-long sandwich was only eleven inches long.
69
 The post 
went viral, and shortly thereafter lawyers began investigating potential 
consumer protection claims against Doctor’s Associates, the parent 
company of Subway.
70
 In the same year, the named plaintiffs and their 
counsel filed complaints in several different courts, each alleging that 
Subway unfairly and deceptively marketed its sandwiches resulting in 
each plaintiff receiving less food than he or she had bargained for.
71
 
Thereafter, Subway requested that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation transfer the individual actions to a single district for 
consolidation. However, while waiting for the panel to agree to the 
request, the parties agreed to mediation.
72
 During this time, the parties 
engaged in initial informal discovery which led the plaintiffs to 
recognize the difficulties of obtaining class certification on claims for 
monetary damages and as such, decided to seek only injunctive 
relief.
73
 While the Panel had agreed to consolidate the cases in one 
district, the parties continued to attend mediation sessions; by March 
2014 the parties had agreed to a settlement.
74 
 
As part of the settlement, Subway agreed that for a period of four 
years, it would engage in a number of inspection measures designed to 
ensure that the Subway loaves were at least twelve inches long.
75 
Additionally, Subway agreed to post notices in stores, and on its 
                                                 
68
 In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig., 316 
F.R.D. 240, 242 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereafter 






 Id.  
72
 Id.  
73
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Presented before the district court were the plaintiffs’ motion for 
final approval of a settlement, class counsel’s motion for attorneys’ 
fees, and an incentive award for the named plaintiffs.
77
 Though the 
court had preliminarily approved the settlement, unrepresented 




The district court first considered whether the total value of the 
settlement, $525,000 plus the value of the injunction, was 
reasonable.
79
 The court found that it was, given that the plaintiffs 
could not likely recover more than that amount.
80
 Despite the 
reasonableness, the objector argued that the monetary component of 
the settlement should be allocated to the named and absent class 
members, rather than just to the named plaintiffs and the class 
counsel.
81
 However, the court determined that this was an impractical 
request, considering the costs of informing the class members of the 
settlement, processing the claims and opt-outs, and distribution of 
payment.
82
 As such, rather than leaving everyone out in the cold, the 




Additionally, the objector argued that the named plaintiffs and 
class counsel were inadequate representatives of the absent class 
because the injunctive relief would not actually benefit the class 
members.
84
 Because Subway had already pledged to ensure that all 
Subway Footlong sandwiches would be twelve inches, the objector 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 244. 
77
 Id. at 242. 
78
 Id. at 245.  
79










 Id. at 248. 
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argued that the “new” practices would not provide class members with 
any benefit they do not already enjoy.
85
 The court disagreed, stating 
that the injunctive relief would now provide a mechanism for actual 
enforcement of best practices because class members could enforce 
violations by filing motions for contempt sanctions.
86
 
The court next considered whether the settlement only benefitted 
future Subway customers. Because many Subway patrons are often 
repeat customers, the court found that there is a strong likelihood of 
them purchasing a Subway sandwich again in the future.
87
 This, the 
court determined, meant that the injunctive relief did benefit the 
current class members as well as future customers.
88
 Next, the court 
disagreed with the objector’s argument that the settlement was unfair 
and the named plaintiffs were inadequate class representatives because 
the named plaintiffs would each receive a $500 incentive, while all the 
absent class member received no monetary relief.
89
 Instead, the court 
argued that because it was not practical to distribute damages to the 
class in the first place, awarding $5000 to the named plaintiffs would 
not diminish the amount of damages received by the class overall.
90
 
The district court was then left to determine whether the class 
counsel’s fees were reasonable.
91
 Typically, the reasonableness of 
attorneys’ fees is calculated by the “lodestar method”.
92
 Objector 
Frank however, did not actually contend that class counsel’s requested 
fee exceeded what was reasonable under the lodestar computation.
93 
Instead, he disputed the reasonableness of counsel appropriating the 
                                                 
85












 Id. at 252. 
92
 Id.; the lodestar method calculates the hours reasonably expended on the 
case multiplied by a reasonable hour rate. The court may then adjust the fee up or 
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entire cash value of the settlement for themselves.
94
 In its analysis of 
the issue, the court determined that because the defendant had already 
agreed to the fee, the award was reasonable.
95
 Further, the court noted 
that given the modest value of the settlement, any remaining amount 
not given to the attorneys could not feasibly be distributed to the class 
members.
96
 As such, the court held that the reasonableness of the fee 
should be measured “by the value of the injunctive relief in relation to 
what the class members have given up in exchange for that relief.”
97
 
Viewed in this way, the court found that by approving all aspects of 
the settlement, including the attorneys’ fees, the injunctive relief 
would end the alleged deceptive marketing practices and allow for 
consumer class members to hold Subway accountable were they to 




B. The Seventh Circuit Discussion 
 
After having unsuccessfully objected to the settlement, class 
objector Theodore Frank, appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
99
 In the 
opinion, Judge Diane Sykes stated that even though the standard of 
review is deferential to the district court, in this case, the district judge 
is similar to a fiduciary of the class.
100 
 As a fiduciary, the judge is held 
to a higher duty of care and must give the requirements of class 
certification “undiluted, even heightened, attention.”
101
 Because Rule 
23(a) requires that class representatives “fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class,” it was essential for the court to consider the 












 In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Marketing and Sales Practices Litig, 869 
F. 3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereafter referred to as “Subway 2”). 
100
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interests of the unnamed class members.
102
 Judge Sykes recognized, as 
many other judges have, that class action settlements often serve to 
benefit everyone but the actual class: class counsel seeks a settlement 
to get fees and the defendant, such as Subway, supports the settlement 
to avoid liability and negative press.
103
 
As such, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the settlement 
provided any meaningful benefit to the class.
104
 Judge Sykes decided 
that because the risk of a slightly shorter sandwich was the same 
before and after the settlement, the approved settlement was utterly 
worthless.
105
 The court ultimately held that when a class settlement 
results in fees for class counsel, but yields no meaningful benefits for 
the class, it is “no better than a racket.”
106
 Even class members’ ability 




Subway 2 is a clear illustration of the effect exorbitant attorneys’ 
fees have on class action lawsuits. Whether Subway truly engaged in 
misleading or deceptive advertising is almost entirely obfuscated by 
the fact that the settlement served only to line the pockets of class 
counsel. The Seventh Circuit held where a worthless settlement 
provides a worthless remedy, thus leaving “zero plus zero [to] equal [] 




WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE REASONABLE CONSUMER? 
 
The language of Rule 23 clearly states that a primary concern in 
class action lawsuits is the fair and adequate protection of the class 
interest.
109
 CAFA’s passage in 2005 was, at least in part, intended to 
                                                 
102
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
103
 Subway II, 869 F. 3d at 556.  
104
 Id.  
105
 Id. at 256-57. 
106
 Id. at 256. 
107




 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
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protect consumer class members from excessive attorneys’ fees.
110
 
And, though the Seventh Circuit acknowledged as much in Subway 2, 
it did not provide guidance on what consumers and plaintiffs should 
do when class action litigation fails to serve as a proper path to 
resolution or when individual lawsuits prove too costly to bare. 
 
A. Do Labels Really Matter? 
 
One of the difficulties plaintiffs face in pursuing deception-based 
class action lawsuits is overcoming the “reasonable consumer” 
standard.
111
 In In re 100% Grated Parmesan, the plaintiffs alleged 
they had been deceived by the labels on grated parmesan cheese 
products.
112
 The court stated that the deceptiveness of a statement 
must be determined by the effect it has on a reasonable consumer.
113
 
This standard “requires a probability that a significant portion of the 
general consuming public . . ., acting reasonably in the circumstances, 
could be misled.”
114
 Additionally, the allegedly deceptive act must be 
viewed in context with the entire packaging.
115
 As such, the issue 
centered on whether the allegedly misleading labels were ambiguous, 
and if so, would any other part of the label dispel a plaintiff’s 
confusion.
116
 If context cleared up the deception, the claim was 
defeated, if it did not, then the claim could proceed.
117
 The court 
determined that because the labels were ambiguous and the plaintiffs 
                                                 
110
 See CAFA, supra note 26, at (b)(1). 
111




 In re 100% Parmesan, 2017 WL 3642076, at *1. 
113
 Id. at *5. 
114








: Selling the Footlong Short: How Consumers Inch Toward Satisfactio
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 13                                        Fall 2017 
 
278 
only had to read the ingredient list on the back of the product, the 
reasonable consumer was not likely to be misled.
118
 
What the court in In re 100% Grated Parmesan lost sight of was 
that every day, consumers are inundated with advertisements on 
billboards, in television commercials, and on grocery story displays. 
Each advertisement attempts to convince the public to purchase its 
product over another. Food and beverage producers know that 
successful marketing campaigns affect the average consumer’s 
purchases. In 2015, over $560 billion was spent on brand marketing, 
and that amount is expected to increase to over $740 billion by 
2020.
119
 More specifically, companies spent roughly $67 billion 
dollars on packaging alone in 2015.
120
 
Viewed in this light, it is clear that businesses are heavily invested 
in what goes on their packaging. Companies carefully select the 
language to be put on their labels in order to distinguish their products 
from others. The intention is that the words will draw in the public and 
entice them to purchase the goods. The average shopper may have an 
idea about the products they are looking for, but often rely on 
packaging and branding to make a purchase decision.
121
 If consumers 
were persuaded to purchase products by what a label says, companies 
would not invest so much of their budget on packaging and marketing. 
As such, consumers “should [not] be expected to look beyond 
misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the truth 
from the ingredient list in small print on the side of the box.”
122
 To 
expect otherwise encourages companies to continue spending their 
marketing dollars on misleading and ambiguous advertisements.  
 
                                                 
118
 Id. at *6. 
119
 John Wolfe, Marketing Spend on Brand Activation will top $595 Billion in 




 David Court, Dave Elzinga, Susan Mulder, and Ole Jorgen Vetvik, The 




 William v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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B. The Legal Community Can Make a Difference. 
 
Whether the issue at hand involves food and beverage sales 
practices or some other matter, class action litigation is in need of 
reform. This Article proposes that, like the the district court in Subway 
1, other courts should reassess the value of injunctive relief as it 
pertains to food class action litigation.
123
 In Subway 2, the Seventh 
Circuit determined that the injunctive relief proposed by the settlement 
was worthless because despite new quality-control measures and the 
inclusion of disclaimers in their ads, Subway would never be able to 
guarantee that each loaf of bread would always be twelve inches 
long.
124
 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court argued that the 
reasonableness of a class counsel’s fee award as well as the settlement 
itself cannot and should not always be measured by the size of the 
monetary relief to the class members.
125
 Courts should not be 
immediately dissuaded by the amount of class counsel fees but rather 
give pause to consider the value of injunctions. Injunctive relief can 
“preserve each class member’s right to bring a subsequent action for 
monetary damages, either individually or as part of a class action”
126
 
should a defendant breach the terms of the agreement. By elevating the 
value of injunctions, plaintiff consumers will maintain at least one 
modest way of forcing food companies to examine their practices.  
Currently, consumers and producers are still waiting for the FDA 
to issue further guidance on what the term “natural” means.
127
 Other 
regulatory agencies should follow suit and provide clarity on common 
labeling terms. The more direction provided to companies, the easier it 
will be for them to tailor their marketing and advertisements 
accordingly. Furthermore, the more narrowly defined the terms, the 
easier it will be to differentiate between frivolous and meritorious 
food-related claims. Additionally, in light of more recent cases such as 
                                                 
123
 Subway I, 316 F.R.D. at 252. 
124
 In re Subway II, 869 F.3d 551, 556-57 (7th Cir. 2017). 
125




 See FDA Request for Comments, supra note 48. 
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the Ninth Circuit’s Gerber Products Co.,
128
 the FTC should consider 
issuing an updated letter of guidance on what it means to deceive a 
reasonable consumer. Because it is plausible “that a consumer might 
rely on the representation [on the label] . . . without looking at the 
ingredients,”
 129
 the FTC should factor in what a reasonable consumer 
relies on in making their purchases. 
Finally, Congress should pass the Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation Act, which would eliminate many of the no-injury class 
actions while also requiring that a majority of the settlement award go 
to class members, rather than class counsel.
130
 This legislation would 
“assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members . . . with 
legitimate claims” as well as “diminish abuses in class action . . . 
litigation that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. legal 
system.”
131
 On March 9, 2017, this bill was passed by the House and 
has since been sent to the Senate for review. Should this legislation be 
enacted, class action procedures would undergo several substantive 
changes.  
In an effort to ease any concerns over unmeritorious complaints, 
under the new act, a court could not certify a class unless there is a 
“rigorous analysis of the evidence.”
132
 Additionally, the bill would 
address several issues relating to attorney’s fee awards. First, it would 
delay payment of class counsel’s fees until after the distribution of 
monetary recovery to the class.
133
 Second, rather than tying attorney’s 
fee awards to the total amount of the class settlement fund, the awards 
would be limited to “a reasonable percentage” of the payments 
actually distributed and received by class members.
134
 Finally, the bill 
                                                 
128
 See Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008). 
129
 Thorton v. Pinnacle Foods Group LLC, No. 4:16-CV-00158 JAR, 2016 WL 
4073713, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016). 
130
 H.R. 985, 115th Cong. §102 (2017). 
131
 Id. at §102(1)-(2). 
132
 Id. at §1716(b). 
133
 Id. at §1718(b)(1). 
134
 Id. at §1718(b)(2). 
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would tie the calculation of fees in injunctive classes to the value of 
the injunctive relief provided to class members.
135
 
 There appears to be no end in sight for class action ligation based 
on food and beverage sales and marketing practices; however, rather 
than dismissing these cases out of hand, legislators, regulatory 
agencies, and courts should work together to develop better methods 
of ensuring that these types of lawsuits become more equitable for 
both plaintiffs and defendants. 
  
                                                 
135
 Id. at §1718(b)(3). 
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